By Sofie E. Miller & Daniel R. Pérez
On March 29th, the U.S. Senate Committee on Small Business & Entrepreneurship met to consider legislative reforms that would affect how small businesses confront and shape regulations. This prepared statement for the record focuses on S. 584: Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act. The analysis suggests that the Committee should: be careful to avoid the problem of double-counting indirect costs, use an evidence-based regulation framework to strengthen retrospective review, and safeguard against unintentionally reducing the efficacy of the existing Small Business Advocacy Review process.
By Susan E. Dudley
As President Trump prepares to announce his nominee to head the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), this Regulatory Insight provides an inside look at the functions of this small but powerful office, its origins and procedures, and why, when it comes to government policy, the job of OIRA administrator is the most important job in Washington you may never have heard of.
Public Comment on OMB’s Interim Guidance Implementing Section 2 of the Executive Order Titled “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs”
By Susan E. Dudley, Brian F. Mannix, Sofie E. Miller, & Daniel R. Pérez
In this comment on the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs’ (OIRA) interim guidance on Executive Order 13771, GW Regulatory Studies Center scholars acknowledge that the Order represents a significant departure from past practice, however, they emphasize that the additional budgeting constraints it imposes need not supplant longstanding requirements to examine regulatory benefits as well as costs and to achieve regulatory objectives as cost-effectively as possible. The comment reinforces OIRA’s draft questions and answers, and offers some suggestions for clarification and improvement.
By Marcus Peacock
President-elect Trump endorsed “a requirement that for every new federal regulation, two existing regulations need to be eliminated” or what could be called a “two-for-one” requirement. This working paper addresses how such a process might work including its scope; what to measure; additional workload; and whether it outlasts a Trump administration.
By Sofie E. Miller and Daniel R. Pérez
The final months of presidential administrations are accompanied by a significant increase in regulatory output as the executive branch relies increasingly on unilateral activity in a rush to implement its remaining policy priorities. This has come to be known as the “midnight period.” This report contains two robust, quantitative models that contribute to the scholarship in this area by: predicting the number of economically significant rules likely to be issued during the Obama administration’s final months, and finding that independent regulatory agencies do not increase their regulatory output during presidential transitions.
By Richard J. Pierce
When you combine the effects of the Executive Orders that forbid an agency from issuing a rule with costs that exceed its benefits to society with the effects of the Executive Orders that require agencies to identify and to rescind or amend any existing rule with costs that exceed its social benefits, you get a regulatory budget that maximizes the net social benefits created by rules issued by federal agencies by ensuring that the aggregate social benefits of those rules exceed the aggregate costs of those rules. That is a sensible version of a regulatory budget. Any version of a regulatory budget that considers only the cost of rules and ignores the benefits of rules will reduce social welfare by costing society hundreds of billions of dollars in the forms of loss of lives, increased injuries and illnesses, and damage to property.
Improving the Accountability of Federal Regulatory Agencies, Part II: Assessing Eight Government-wide Accountability Reforms
By Marcus Peacock
Greater accountability at regulatory agencies is desirable because (1) the public has a right to know how government affects society and (2) greater accountability improves agency performance. As described in the last Insight in this series, the U.S. attempted eight major government-wide initiatives to increase accountability at federal agencies, including regulatory agencies. This Insight reviews public and expert opinion, which indicate these initiatives failed to improve accountability. New proposals to improve accountability at regulatory agencies could benefit from understanding why previous efforts fell short.
Improving the Accountability of Federal Regulatory Agencies, Part I: A Review of Government-Wide Efforts
By Marcus Peacock
Given the broad interest in improving regulatory accountability, especially by learning from the actual results achieved by previous regulations, it is ironic that little has been done to learn from the results of past regulatory reform efforts. Before mandating further requirements, Congress and the President should examine past government-wide accountability initiatives to assess their outcomes. This first Regulatory Policy Insight in a series of three on improving regulatory accountability identifies eight major past initiatives. Future Insights will examine the relative success of these eight reforms and what lessons they offer.
By Richard J. Pierce, Jr.
For 35 years OIRA has used benefit-cost-analysis to review major rules issued by executive branch agencies. Generally, OIRA reviews major proposed agency rules to determine whether their expected benefits to society exceed their expected costs to society. If the estimated costs of a proposed rule exceed its estimated benefits, OIRA urges the agency to change the rule in ways that will increase its benefits and reduce its costs. For almost as long as OIRA has been applying BCA, some of the smartest and most productive progressive scholars have criticized the role of OIRA generally and OIRA’s use of BCA in particular. It is time for those scholars to stop wasting their energy tilting at windmills and put their extraordinary talents to use in more promising endeavors.
By Susan E. Dudley
Despite efforts to ensure that new regulations provide net benefits to citizens, the accumulation of regulations threatens economic growth and well-being. As a result, Congress is exploring the possibility that applying fiscal budgeting concepts to regulation could bring more accountability and transparency to the regulatory process. This Essay in the NYU Journal of Legislation and Public Policy examines the advantages and challenges of applying regulatory budgeting practices and draws some preliminary conclusions based on successful experiences in other countries.
By Sofie E. Miller
In testimony before the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and Power, Senior Policy Analyst Sofie E. Miller explains that one-size-fits-all energy efficiency standards can deprive consumers of the ability purchase the appliances that best suit their unique circumstances and constraints. As a result, these regulations cost consumers rather than benefiting them, as the Department of Energy posits. In addition, these standards disparately impact low- and median-income households, and current analyses of their effects suggest that these populations bear significant costs as a result.
Public Comment on Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services
By J. Howard Beales III
The FCC has proposed detailed rules governing privacy practices of broadband Internet access service (“BIAS”) providers. The rule would establish new, and different, privacy standards, beyond those that apply to other Internet companies. This comment argues that the FCC’s rationales for treating BIAS providers differently are flawed and the proposed separate regulatory regime for broadband providers would inhibit innovation, reduce competition, and harm consumers. If it feels it must regulate, the FCC should adopt a functionality based approach to privacy regulation to maximize consumer welfare.
The Federal Government on Autopilot: Delegation of Regulatory Authority to an Unaccountable Bureaucracy
By Sofie E. Miller
In testimony before the House Task Force on Executive Overreach, Senior Policy Analyst Sofie E. Miller explains that retrospective review is a key component of an effective regulatory process because it allows agencies to review whether existing rules are accomplishing their intended goals and to determine what effect they have on the regulated public. Miller argues that writing rules at the outset to facilitate this measurement can improve outcomes and enable policymakers to learn from what has worked and what hasn’t.
By Susan E. Dudley & Melinda Warren
According to a new analysis from the GW Regulatory Studies Center and the Weidenbaum Center at Washington University in St. Louis, fiscal outlays for administering regulation have increased more than 20-fold since 1960. In the final year of the Eisenhower administration, regulatory agencies employed a little more than 57,000 people and spent $533 million (equivalent to $3 billion in 2009 dollars). President Obama’s final budget request to Congress proposes expenditures of $70.0 billion ($61 billion in 2009 dollars) on regulatory activities in FY 2017, and a staff of almost 279,000.
Public Comment to the National Economic Council on The President’s Executive Order 13725: Steps to Increase Competition and Better Inform Consumers and Workers to Support Continued Growth of the American Economy
By Sofie E. Miller, Daniel R. Pérez, Susan E. Dudley & Brian Mannix
This public comment suggests several areas of regulatory policy where federal regulations have hindered, rather than helped, competition, and recommends that agencies take this opportunity to reduce these regulatory barriers to competition.