Publications

The GW Regulatory Studies Center scholars regularly conduct applied research to understand regulatory policy and practice from a public interest perspective. Our content often takes the form of public interest comments, formal testimony, working papers, policy insights, and short commentaries analyzing the most pressing issues in regulatory policy. View the rest of our material by the different types of publications listed on this page or our research areas.

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What We Publish

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Public Comments & Testimonies

Scholarly analysis of the potential effects of particular rulemakings from federal agencies, and advice to Congress on how to improve the rulemaking process.

 

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Commentaries & Insights

Short-form publications intended for all audiences which provide easy to access analysis of regulatory policy.

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Books & Reports

Formal publications, often completed with other leading organizations and individuals, providing a thorough understanding of regulations and the rulemaking process.

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Newsletters

The weekly Regulation Digest contains everything you need to know about regulatory policy today, and our monthly Center Update gives you all of the latest from our team.

 

For accessible charts and supporting data that you can use in your own publications or presentations, visit the Reg Stats page.

 


Latest Publications 

Skipping Notice and Comment Over Time

The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs makes regulatory review data on interim-final rules easily accessible. Analyzing interim-final rules that have gone through regulatory review over time can shed light on the success of agency efforts to bypass the notice-and-comment process.

A Midyear Review of Regulatory Sentiment and Uncertainty

This commentary provides a midyear review highlighting patterns in the news-based measures of regulatory sentiment and uncertainty during the past months of 2021. Regulatory sentiment reached a historically high point in May, and regulatory uncertainty rose in July.

Distributional Language in Regulatory Executive Orders

To achieve the goals outlined in Biden's Modernizing Regulatory Review Memorandum, federal agencies will likely build on the distributional language of the executive orders highlighted in this commentary.

Two Ideas to Improve Equity in Government Decisions

Updating what burdens paperwork requirements can impose and encouraging agencies to better engage the public can improve equity in government decisions.

Unsolicited Advice for FTC Chair Khan

New FTC Chair Lina Khan has not sought my advice, but here it is. In his July 9 Executive Order, President Biden described an antitrust agenda that he wants the FTC and the other agencies with antitrust responsibilities to implement. His agenda consists of 72 major changes in competition law. Any agency that attempts to implement an agenda that includes that many major changes in law at the same time is doomed to failure. No agency has the resources required to implement an agenda that ambitious. Chair Khan and her colleagues need to choose no more than half a dozen parts of the president’s agenda to pursue immediately.

President Biden's Competition Executive Order Breaks New Ground

President Biden's most recent E.O. on competition stands out in terms of its length, prescriptiveness, and application to independent regulatory agencies.

The Frequency of Regulatory Suspensions in the 21st Century

Regulatory suspensions are tools for presidents to delay the effective or compliance dates of the prior administration’s rules. Analyzing regulatory data from the Federal Register, we demonstrate how the use of regulatory suspensions has varied from the presidencies of George W. Bush to Joe Biden.

President Biden’s New Order: A Central Plan To Impose Competition

President Biden’s sweeping executive order aimed at promoting competition includes some promising actions but also many that will likely inhibit competition.