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Quick Links:
- Federal Courts and Administrative Law
- Changes to EOP Regulatory Procedures
- Healthcare Regulations
- Climate and Energy Regulations
- Environmental Permitting Regulations
- Labor Regulations
- AI and Data Center Regulations
- Immigration Regulations
- Economic and Financial Regulations
- Conclusion
Introduction
Last year, the overarching story in regulatory studies was the presidential transition. At noon on January 20, as the presidency changed hands, the administrative state stopped in its tracks and pivoted from one party’s policy priorities to the other’s.
These transitions are so jarring because the executive branch now dominates federal policymaking. During the twenty-first century, as Congress receded as an institution, the presidency filled the vacuum. In 2025, for example, agencies issued 2,441 law-like regulations, while Congress passed only 68 actual laws.
At the GW Regulatory Studies Center (RSC), we sought to better understand both how the outgoing president tried to entrench “midnight” regulations, and also how the incoming president tried to reverse his predecessor’s work (either unilaterally or by working with lawmakers through the Congressional Review Act).
Beyond the regulatory ping-pong, every president puts their personal gloss on administrative policymaking under their watch, and President Trump’s second term has been characterized by an expansive conception of executive power. Examples include a push to end tenure protections for chiefs of historically independent agencies, unilateral reductions in the civil service, and unprecedented exercises of the president’s direct regulatory powers (including the declaration of 11 “emergencies”). To be sure, most of these measures face legal challenges, so it remains to be seen if the Trump administration’s extensions of executive authority will stick.
This Regulatory Insight highlights nine important areas of regulatory developments in 2025.
1. Federal Courts and Administrative Law
In 2025, the courts continued to shape regulatory process through administrative law. Notably, the continued viability of “independent” agencies hangs in the balance. Legal scholars have long debated the president’s constitutional authority over government officers, but President Trump forced the issue by defying legislation prohibiting him from firing the leaders of independent agencies without cause. In a subsequently much debated 1935 decision, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of these tenure restrictions, which are the sine qua non of independent agencies. This term, the Court will revisit the matter in Trump v. Slaughter.
Another important legal story is the lower courts’ ongoing reception of the two landmark administrative law decisions from 2024: Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) v. Jarkesy. In Loper Bright, of course, the Supreme Court ended Chevron deference for legal interpretations by regulatory agencies. But the wheels of justice grind slowly, such that it was only in 2025 that the effects of Loper Bright started to be felt in the lower courts. Two emerging trends are evident. The first is that the government is advancing various substitutes for Chevron in court. The second is that the government appears to be winning significantly fewer disputes over statutory interpretation in a world without Chevron deference.[1]
SEC v. Jarkesy is the other landmark case from 2024 that is now unfolding in the lower courts. In Jarkesy, the Supreme Court held that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury applies to civil money penalties imposed by the SEC, with the result being that the agency no longer could prosecute these fines in their in-house administrative courts. But the Jarkesy Court did not explain how its decision affects the dozens of other agencies that can try monetary penalty cases administratively. The Court instead left that job for the lower courts, which are proceeding on a regime-by-regime basis. The Fifth Circuit, for example, last year sustained the constitutionality of monetary penalty proceedings at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (in Ortega v. OCC), while the court also rejected the use of adjudication by the Federal Communications Commission as unconstitutional under the Seventh Amendment (in AT&T v. FCC).
An ongoing case with potentially significant implications is Texas Trade Groups v. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Filed by several Texas-based trade associations, the lawsuit contends that OSHA lacks constitutional authority to promulgate workplace safety regulations. The plaintiffs argue that OSHA’s organic statute does not provide limits on the agency’s discretion, thereby violating the nondelegation doctrine by granting overly broad and indeterminate regulatory power without the requisite intelligible principle to guide its actions. If the plaintiffs win, the decision could breathe life into the long-dormant nondelegation doctrine.
2. Changes to EOP Regulatory Procedures
This year, a central objective of the administration’s regulatory agenda was deregulation, pursued most directly with procedural constraints on regulatory output. Soon after taking office, President Trump issued Executive Order (EO) 14192, which required agencies to eliminate ten existing regulations for every new regulation issued, an escalation of the earlier “1-in-2-out” offset framework of the first Trump administration. A June Office of Management and Budget (OMB) memo guided the implementation of these requirements, clarifying how agencies are to account for regulatory costs and offsets.
On day one, the president established by EO 14210 a major new player, the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) with a mission to “moderniz[e] Federal technology and software to maximize governmental efficiency and productivity.” Led by Elon Musk, DOGE quickly exerted sweeping authority across the federal government, including regulation (as well as personnel, contracting, and agency structure). In February, the president DOGE’s expanded mission to include “commenc[ing] the deconstruction of the overbearing and burdensome administrative state.” EO 14219 directed agencies to work with DOGE, OMB, and the Attorney General to “review all regulations…for consistency with law and administration policy,” as well as for their economic and policy effects, including whether regulatory burdens are justified by public benefits and aligned with broader national interests. The order implicitly framed this review against the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright. A subsequent presidential memorandum was more explicit, arguing that recent U.S. Supreme Court opinions gave agencies “ample cause and the legal authority to immediately repeal” certain rules without public notice and comment.
In an October memorandum, Jeffrey Clark, then-acting administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), further encouraged reliance on legal arguments, rather than regulatory impact analyses, to justify rescinding regulations. The memo encouraged agencies to identify “facially unlawful” regulations and bypass notice-and-comment procedures under the “good cause” exception of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. The Clark memo also promised expedited OIRA review of agencies’ deregulatory actions, reducing the maximum review time from 120 to 28 days for deregulatory actions supported by factual records and to 14 days for actions repealing rules deemed “facially unlawful.” RSC director (and former OIRA administrator) Susan Dudley expressed concern that this would reduce “analytical rigor, interagency coordination, and accountability” for federal regulations. It is consistent, however, with the administration’s goal of moving very quickly to remove regulations. In July, a leaked DOGE slide deck envisioned that, using artificial intelligence (AI), agencies could analyze more than 200,000 federal regulations and eliminate 50% that are “not statutorily required” by January 2026.
Consistent with the president’s effort to exert greater control over independent regulatory agencies, as noted above, in February, he signed EO 14215 requiring them, for the first time, to submit their draft regulations to OIRA before publication. The order amends EO 12866 (which has governed executive agency regulatory analysis and OIRA review since 1993) to cover independent agencies, except the Federal Reserve’s monetary functions.[2] OIRA subsequently issued detailed guidance for compliance. Together, these measures strengthened centralized oversight of regulatory activity and introduced procedural asymmetries that favored regulatory revision and repeal.
Despite all these dramatic changes in regulatory procedure, the administration has retained some core tenets that have guided U.S. regulation since at least the early 1980s. While regulatory impact analysis appears to be taking a back seat to legal analysis in justifying the regulatory agenda and evaluating regulations, the president has retained EO 12866 and even extended it to independent agencies. It also reversed Biden administration revisions to the 20-year-old guidance for conducting regulatory impact analysis.[3]
3. Healthcare Regulations
Thus far, the second Trump Administration’s healthcare priorities have been significantly influenced by events that occurred during the first administration, in particular the COVID-19 pandemic. In May, President Trump signed EO 14292, which ended federal funding for both gain-of-function research and other potentially dangerous life science research in “countries of concern” and other countries that lack sufficient oversight to ensure compliance with American oversight standards and policies. The order also directed agency heads to temporarily suspend certain federally funded life science research until the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) develops a new oversight and enforcement policy.
This was followed by EO 14293, which aimed to streamline the domestic production of pharmaceuticals, consistent with the Trump administration’s goals of increasing supply chain resilience and reshoring critical industries. The order instructed the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to review its regulations and guidance documents on the development of domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities and, ultimately, eliminate any duplicative or unnecessary requirements. The EO further directed the FDA to improve the timeliness and predictability of inspections and approvals for domestic facilities, while also increasing the regularity and rigor of inspections at overseas facilities. Lastly, the order tasked the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other relevant agencies with reviewing regulations that can hinder the construction of domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities and eliminating unnecessary barriers.
Reducing the price of prescription drugs was another top priority for the Trump administration in 2025. EO 14273 directed federal agencies[4] to identify and implement administrative, regulatory, and programmatic actions to lower prescription drug prices and expand patient access. The order includes reforms to federal purchasing and reimbursement practices, efforts to increase competition through generics and biosimilars, and measures to improve transparency and resiliency across the pharmaceutical value chain.
Similarly, EO 14297 directed the secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to lead an initiative to grant American consumers access to prescription drugs at the lowest prices paid for the same drugs in comparable developed nations. The EO’s stated purpose is to ensure that Americans will no longer be “forced to subsidize low-cost prescription drugs and biologics in other developed countries, and face overcharges for the same products in the United States.” To ensure compliance, the order suggests that the HHS Secretary impose most favored nation pricing via rulemaking and allow importation of lower-priced foreign alternatives if the pharmaceutical manufacturers do not voluntarily comply with the EO’s price targets. It also encourages direct-to-consumer purchasing programs and tasks the Commerce Secretary and the U.S. Trade Representative with taking action to ensure that foreign countries are not engaged in any practices that artificially suppress drug prices abroad while shifting innovation costs onto American consumers.
HHS Secretary Kennedy’s Make America Healthy Again initiative has been an important influence in the second Trump administration. In February, EO 14212 established a federal commission tasked with studying ways to improve American health, especially among children, by examining causes of chronic disease and proposing a national strategy for prevention and health promotion. That same month, EO 14221 sought to empower American patients to make more informed decisions about their healthcare by directing federal agencies to strengthen and enforce price transparency rules.
The Trump administration also engaged in a substantial amount of healthcare rulemaking over the past year. Notable examples include: the repeal of Biden era staffing requirements for long-term care facilities; tightened enrollment standards for Affordable Care Act insurance exchanges and an update on Medicare payment rates for physicians; and a reform of state taxes on providers.
From a regulatory studies perspective, one important development was the rescission by HHS of the long-standing Richardson waiver, which had voluntarily required public notice-and-comment periods for regulations involving public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts. Revoking the waiver allows HHS to bypass public input, which would quicken deregulation but would do so at the expense of stakeholder engagement.
4. Climate and Energy Regulations
Energy production from traditional sources was a major focus for the Trump administration. In February, the administration issued EO 14213, establishing the National Energy Dominance Council[5] to 1) identify regulatory barriers to domestic energy production, 2) advise the president on improvements to the permitting, production, generation, and distribution process, and 3) identify ways to facilitate cooperation from private sector energy producers. Interestingly, the strategy is inclusive of critical mineral producers, suggesting an additional focus on battery storage and other upstream technologies.
This was preceded by two early EOs focused on permitting energy infrastructure. The first, EO 14156, declared an emergency under the National Emergencies Act to address what the administration describes as the “precariously inadequate and intermittent energy supply, and an increasingly unreliable grid.” The order calls on agencies to use emergency authorities to expedite permits for certain types of energy infrastructure. This was coupled with EO 14154, which required all agencies to review regulations that may place a burden on energy development, with a focus on oil, gas, coal, hydropower, biofuels, nuclear, and critical minerals. These actions suggest a supply-side push for energy production, without a clear role for reducing consumer demand for energy (e.g. energy efficiency standards, load management, and others).
The latter point is further reflected in the administration’s outlook towards emissions reduction. On the commercial energy production side, EPA proposed a repeal of all greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) standards for stationary sources previously established under Section 111 of the Clean Air Act. This means that fossil fuel-fired electricity-generating units would no longer be subject to GHG performance requirements under the Clean Air Act. The agency reasoned that emissions do not “contribute significantly” to dangerous air pollution. EPA also proposed a rule to rescind the 2009 endangerment finding, which is the determination that motor vehicles and engines contribute to air pollution that may harm public health and had previously given the federal government the authority to regulate GHGs under the Clean Air Act. Rescinding this finding would make it more difficult for agencies to regulate vehicle emissions and engines without additional action by Congress.
Similarly, a proposed National Highway Traffic Safety Administration rule would roll back the Biden administration’s Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards.[6] This change would revise the fuel economy standard from 50.4 miles per gallon by model year 2031 to 34.5 miles per gallon for the same year. It is important to note that while this represented a significant drop in maximum allowed emissions, Congress has concurrently amended the civil penalties for noncompliance with federal fuel economy standards, reducing the maximum civil penalty to zero under the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA). This would, by itself, severely weaken the enforcement mechanism used for the CAFE standards.
At the same time, the administration has shown some signs of expanding the role of nuclear power. In July, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a direct final rule extending the period during which a reactor design is deemed to meet federal safety and security requirements from 15 to 40 years. In addition, President Trump issued four EOs (EO 14302, EO 14301, EO 14300, and EO 14299), which collectively seek to diminish the regulatory burden on the nuclear industry and bolster nuclear supply chains.
Another major supply-side initiative was a proposed rescission of President Biden’s 2024 rule regarding the Alaska National Petroleum Reserve (NPR), which had imposed a set of environmental permitting and indigenous consultation requirements. The Department of Interior proposed returning to the pre-2024 framework, thereby reducing barriers to leasing and development within the NPR.
Finally, President Trump set his sights on state regulations that might conflict with his energy dominance agenda. EO 14260 directed the Attorney General to identify state and local laws that burden the development and siting of energy resources. The EO specifically identifies initiatives related to environmental, social and governance initiatives, environmental justice, GHGs, and carbon taxes as relevant to the order, as well as recent climate superfund laws and lawsuits for climate-related damages.
5. Environmental Permitting Regulations
As part of the administration’s effort to streamline the permitting process, executive branch agencies have taken unprecedented steps to reduce the stringency of the environmental review process, with a focus on the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).[7] First, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) issued an interim final rule rescinding longstanding rules that had guided the NEPA process at regulatory agencies. The rescinded rules had shaped decades of the law’s implementation.[8]
Following CEQ’s interim final rule, agencies rescinded their previously established NEPA rules. CEQ next issued a memorandum on the promulgation of new NEPA implementation rules. Since then, several major agencies, including DOI, the Department of Commerce (Commerce), Department of Energy, Air Force, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Department of Agriculture, and Corps of Engineers, have all issued notices, proposed rules, or interim final rules to update their NEPA regulations.
In May, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case involving the construction of a railway line from the Uinta Basin in Utah to the Gulf Coast oil refineries, Seven Counties Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County. The plaintiffs claimed that the agency inadequately addressed the project’s indirect effects, including downstream GHG emissions. The Court ruled against the plaintiffs, finding that the agency acted within its discretion in limiting its analysis to reasonably foreseeable environmental effects. The decision could have far-reaching effects, as the Court admonished lower courts for “assum[ing] an aggressive role in policing agency compliance with NEPA.” If this decision reaches the lower courts as intended, the result will be a significant reduction in judicial scrutiny of indirect effects under NEPA.
Congress, too, has involved itself in NEPA reform. It introduced multiple Congressional Review Act (CRA) resolutions to overturn records of decisions for federal resource management plans. If signed into law, this would mark the first time that Congress has used the CRA to nullify a resource management plan. The House has passed the bipartisan Standardizing Permitting and Expediting Economic Development Act (SPEED) Act, aimed at reducing judicial review standards, shortening timelines, and narrowing the scope of NEPA review, however, several key senators have indicated that there are long odds that the bill clears the Senate without major changes to the president’s discretionary powers to revoke permits.
NEPA is not the only permitting regime that underwent major changes this year. FERC issued a direct final rule implementing EO 14270 requiring “zero-based budgeting.” The rule would add conditional sunset dates to 53 existing FERC regulations, causing them to expire one year after the rule’s effective date, unless FERC determines that specific provisions should remain in effect. This rule points to a broader shift towards more frequent assessments of regulations.
One of the most notable changes came at the end of the year. In late 2025, EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers issued a proposed rule modifying the definition of “Waters of the United States.” This definition is the key to determining the reach of the federal permitting program under the Clean Water Act. The proposed rule, which is a response to Sackett v. EPA, would revise the 2023 rule by clarifying which waters fall under federal jurisdiction, including new definitions for “relatively permanent waters” and “continuous surface connection,” as well as removing interstate waters as an independent category. While not yet finalized, this proposed rule would significantly limit federal jurisdiction (relative to the 2023 rule).
6. Labor Regulations
In keeping with the Trump administration’s intent to undo many of the Biden administration’s signature policies, the past year saw rollbacks of numerous diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) and diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility (DEIA) rules, as well as changes to Equal Employment Opportunity-related rules and guidance. During his first week in office, President Trump signed a series of EOs that rescinded prior Biden administration DEI EOs and presidential memoranda (EO 14148), directed the termination of federal DEI and DEIA programs and mandates across executive agencies (EO 14151), and revoked (EO 14173) President Lyndon Johnson’s long-standing EO 11246, which had prohibited discrimination and required affirmative action in the employment practices of federal contractors and subcontractors. The stated intent of these EOs is to substitute an emphasis on “merit” for the previous perceived emphasis on “equity” across federal hiring, contracting, and program administration.
In the subsequent months, the Department of Labor (DOL) rescinded regulations governing nondiscrimination and equal opportunity for federally funded workforce programs, while the Department of Justice (DOJ) repealed portions of its implementing regulations for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which substantially curtailed the federal government’s use of disparate-impact liability[9] in the administration and enforcement of federally assisted programs.
DOL further eliminated a regulatory obligation to implement affirmative action in apprenticeship programs, proposed eliminating the seven percent disability hiring goal for federal contractors, and proposed exempting third-party home care workers from minimum wage and overtime requirements.
Due to President Trump’s personnel decisions, the three-member National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) lacked a quorum for virtually all of 2025, meaning that it could not issue regulatory rulings. In recent weeks, however, the Senate confirmed two new NLRB board members, giving the agency the quorum it needs to operate. In 2026, the NLRB will have a backlog of cases to address.
7. AI and Data Center Regulations
AI regulation in 2025 unfolded in fragments rather than through a single governing framework. While Congress did not enact comprehensive AI legislation, federal policy developed primarily through EOs, agency guidance, and interim rules, as the White House and executive agencies repeatedly emphasized the need to remove barriers to AI innovation.
Within days of taking office, the president issued EO 14179, which directed agencies to identify and reduce regulatory constraints on AI development and deployment. A July White House policy document, “America’s AI Action Plan” outlined more than ninety federal actions across innovation, infrastructure, and international engagement aimed at strengthening U.S. competitiveness in AI. Consistent with this agenda, the OSTP issued a request for information (RFI) for AI regulation, soliciting public input on existing federal laws and regulations perceived as barriers to AI adoption.[10]
Also in July, EO 14318 sought to streamline environmental review and permitting for large-scale data centers supporting AI computing power. Issued the same day, EO 14319 directed the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the General Services Administration to condition federal procurement of large language models on “Unbiased AI Principles.”[11] A third order, EO 14320, established an American AI Exports Program to support the development and deployment of U.S. AI technologies abroad by coordinating export promotion with national security, trade, and industrial policy considerations. In December, the White House moved to assert greater federal coordination through EO 14365, which established an AI litigation task force and conditioned certain federal broadband funding on alignment with national AI policy objectives.
Separately, OMB issued a memo to provide guidance on agency AI adoption and risk management. Commerce published an interim final rule establishing a “Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion,” alongside related export control measures on advanced computing integrated circuits, enhanced due diligence requirements, and amendments extending and clarifying compliance obligations. These measures reflect a heightened concern about the national security implications of advanced AI technologies, including their military applications, the risk of intellectual property transfer to strategic competitors, and oversight of how U.S.-developed AI capabilities are deployed abroad.
By contrast, Congress did not enact new legislation governing AI in 2025, although lawmakers did reject a proposed statutory moratorium that would have temporarily limited state-level AI regulation. The moratorium debate exposed tensions between federal authority and state experimentation, rather than yielding consensus on a national pause.
Together, these developments illustrated a year in which AI regulation remained contested and fragmented, with executive ambition increasingly filling gaps left by legislative inaction. The resulting lack of coordination raises concerns about policy incoherence and procedural delays that could adversely affect AI policy development in the U.S.
8. Immigration Regulations
In January, President Trump issued an emergency proclamation under the National Emergencies Act, allowing the deployment of additional resources to the Southern Border to reduce undocumented immigration flows. Subsequently, EO 14159 rescinded previous immigration EOs related to asylum seekers and their families, directing the Attorney General to prioritize prosecution of undocumented immigrants involved in criminal offenses. This marked a clear shift from the prior administration’s emphasis on humanitarian ideals and instead framed immigration policy as an issue of security and sovereignty.
Subsequent actions relied on long-standing statutory authorities to restrict or suspend the entry of certain foreign nationals whose admission President Trump deemed detrimental to U.S. interests. Another proclamation emphasized deficiencies in screening and information sharing with certain foreign governments and directed the State Department to limit entry of citizens from a series of countries deemed to be of concern.[12] Taken together, these initiatives established the legal and policy groundwork for immigration actions throughout the year, anchoring the administration’s approach in national security goals.
Consistent with the national security approach to immigration management, the administration also emphasized interior enforcement and deterrence mechanisms. The president’s memo, Preventing Illegal Aliens from Obtaining Social Security Act Benefits, directs the Social Security Administration, HHS, DOL, and the Department of Homeland Security to strengthen eligibility verification and program integrity controls for programs administered under the Social Security Act. The memo instructs these agencies to identify and prosecute individuals who receive federal benefits despite being ineligible due to their immigration status. These measures reflect an effort to reduce unlawful presence by tightening access to public benefits.
Alongside enforcement and deterrence, the administration expanded the use of screening, surveillance, and identity verification tools across the immigration system. A final ICE rule standardized and broadened the collection of biometric data from noncitizens at both entry and exit, aiming to improve identity confirmation, overstay tracking, and screening against law enforcement and national security databases. This extension of biometric collection across modes of travel sought to close the long-standing gaps in immigration data.
The administration also pursued more rigorous identity verification in visa processing by requiring additional documentation and verification at the application stage, including submission of valid passport information and signature pages. These changes were intended to combat fraud and strengthen vetting before applicants are selected or admitted, increasing security and compliance considerations earlier in the immigration process.
Finally, the administration undertook rulemaking affecting lawful immigration pathways, emphasizing prioritization, labor protections, and administrative control. In employment-based temporary visa programs, DHS proposed to revamp the selection process to move away from a random lottery towards a wage-weighted selection system.
In parallel, the president issued EO 14351 directing agency heads to develop a new investment-based immigration pathway, named the Gold Card. This immigration pathway is designed to attract applicants demonstrating substantial economic contributions, while granting immigration authorities discretion to assess eligibility and monitor compliance.[13] To address persistent backlogs and support more effective administration of immigration cases, DOJ expanded the authority of the Executive Office of Immigration Review to designate temporary administrative law judges within the immigration court system.[14] Together, these actions reflect a coordinated effort to steer lawful immigration pathways through targeted eligibility criteria while expanding adjudicatory capacity to manage application and case volumes.
9. Economic and Financial Regulations
The Trump administration entered 2025 with a clear intention to move quickly on several economic and financial priorities highlighted throughout the presidential campaign, starting with January’s EO 14178 asserting federal oversight over digital financial technologies, payment systems, and related financial market infrastructure. Early rulemakings reflected this agenda. In January, for example, Commerce proposed a rule to restrict foreign technology in vehicle communication systems, due to concerns over data access and technological vulnerability.
In March, EO 14233 established a Strategic Bitcoin Reserve, signaling interest in reshaping the digital asset landscape by centralizing federal management of seized digital assets and mitigating risks to financial stability. That same month, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) withdrew a Biden-era proposal to expand restrictions on brokered deposits and create new governance and risk-management standards for large institutions.[15] By withdrawing this package, the FDIC preserved the existing supervisory framework and avoided new compliance obligations, marking one of the administration’s earliest deregulatory actions in the banking sector.
In April, with EO 14267, the president rescinded specific reporting requirements established under the previous administration’s whole-of-government competition framework, including mandates for agencies to conduct competition reviews, cross-agency coordination structures, and recurring reports on market competition issues.
The most recent deregulatory push came in November with a major rollback in the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s small business lending rule under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B).[16] The revision narrowed the rule’s scope by raising the threshold for covered institutions and reducing the volume of data lenders must collect. This eased compliance burdens for small- and mid-sized lenders and limited the reach of the original fair lending data collection framework.
Midway through the year, the administration turned its attention to bank supervision and prudential standards, issuing a series of rules that reshaped capital planning, merger review, and large-bank capital requirements. These actions shifted towards broader revisions of the federal oversight framework. The Federal Reserve Board (Fed) issued a proposed rule in April, revising both the Capital Plan Rule (CPR) and Stress Capital Buffer (SCB).[17] These changes eased annual planning and reporting expectations under CPR and smoothed requirements by averaging stress-test results over two years instead of one, reducing volatility in stress testing and giving banks greater flexibility in managing projected capital distributions. In July, the FDIC issued a new statement updating its bank-merger review standards for the first time in decades, clarifying expectations related to competition, financial stability, and the convenience-and-needs assessment.
Later in July, the OCC, FDIC, and Fed proposed a rule to rescind the 2023 Community Reinvestment Act framework, which had been blocked by litigation, and reinstate the prior regulations that have long governed how banks are evaluated for meeting credit needs in low- and moderate-income communities. The year concluded with updated leverage-ratio standards for the largest banking organizations, adjusting the enhanced supplementary leverage ratio (eSLR)[18] to reduce its frequency as a binding constraint on capital, which recalibrated capital requirements as part of the broader set of prudential revisions implemented throughout 2025.
One exception to this deregulatory approach concerns merger policy. In 2025, the chief antitrust enforcers, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and DOJ’s Antitrust Division decided to retain the approach to antitrust adopted by the Biden administration. In deciding to maintain the Biden policy, the two agencies cited the importance of stability across administrations. Under Biden, the FTC and DOJ introduced the Merger Guidelines in 2023, replacing the Horizontal Merger Guidelines of 2010 and the Vertical Merger Guidelines of 2020. The latter had been withdrawn in 2021 by Biden’s antitrust enforcers, who rejected its economic approach that recognized efficiencies from vertical mergers. The 2023 Merger Guidelines expanded the FTC and DOJ objectives of merger review. Under the previous Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the primary focus of the agencies’ merger review was consumer welfare, and the agencies would challenge mergers that resulted in a significantly large increase in price or reduction in quality. The 2023 Merger Guidelines broadened the scope of merger review to include the welfare of workers, suppliers, and other providers.
Conclusion
Looking ahead to regulatory policy and practice in 2026, administrative agencies will continue to follow through on the EOs and proposed rulemakings discussed above. At the same time, courts will continue to provide legal clarity on both the scope of the administration’s regulatory and deregulatory initiatives and on the president’s aggressive conception of executive authority over agency personnel and resource allocation. With the midterms approaching, lawmakers typically focus on campaigning, which diminishes the prospects of Congress taking on regulatory reform. However, the midterms also raise the possibility of a lame duck session for the incumbent majorities in the House and Senate at the end of the 119th Congress, which sometimes leads to a “go for broke” mentality in the legislature. Stay tuned.
[1] Early returns indicate that the government is prevailing in about 50% of these statutory cases, whereas under Chevron, the government won about 70% of the time.
[2] Other sections of EO 14215 require additional consultation with OMB and the White House on performance management, budget obligations, and strategic planning.
[4] The agencies include HHS, FDA, OMB, CMS, FTC, DOJ, and Commerce.
[5] The National Energy Dominance Council is distinct from the Energy Council, which is a non-legislative state-led forum for energy issues.
[6] CAFE standards require that a given fleet of vehicles sold by an automaker, on average, improve its fuel efficiency over time.
[7] NEPA requires federal agencies to assess the environmental impacts of major federal actions before making decisions, ensuring that potential effects on the human environment are disclosed. NEPA does not mandate particular outcomes, but it obligates agencies to take a “hard look” at environmental consequences and reasonable alternatives.
[8] For additional details on CEQ’s historic regulatory authority, see RSC Working Paper, Uncertain Authority: How the Decline of CEQ’s Rulemaking Power Risks NEPA Implementation.
[9] Disparate-impact liability is a legal doctrine that uses unequal group outcomes, rather than intent to discriminate, to allege discrimination despite equal treatment. Defenders of disparate-impact liability claim that it is a crucial tool for revealing “systemic discrimination” while its critics assert that it undermines “meritocratic and behavioral standards” in the pursuit of equity.
[10] In a response to the RFI, the Regulatory Studies Center (RSC) identified Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services reimbursement rules as a sector-specific regulatory barrier to the adoption of clinical AI tools in healthcare.
[11] EO 14319 defines “Unbiased AI Principles” as requiring that federally procured LLMs adhere to two core requirements: (1) truth-seeking, meaning models must prioritize factual accuracy, scientific inquiry, and objectivity, and acknowledge uncertainty where reliable information is incomplete or contradictory; and (2) ideological neutrality, meaning models must operate as neutral, nonpartisan tools and must not intentionally encode partisan or ideological judgments into outputs unless such judgments are explicitly prompted by the user.
[12] The proclamation relied primarily on the president’s authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act to suspend or restrict the entry of foreign nationals whose admission is deemed detrimental to U.S. interests, in conjunction with emergency authorities triggered by the national emergency declaration. The resulting entry restrictions apply to nationals of Afghanistan, Burma, Burundi, Chad, Cuba, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Laos, Libya, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Turkmenistan, Venezuela, Yemen.
[13] The Gold Card conditions eligibility on documented capital investment and demonstrable job creation in the U.S., while granting immigration authorities discretion to assess the credibility, durability, and ongoing economic impact of qualifying activities. Eligibility is not tied to a single sponsoring employer and is subject to continued compliance and review.
[14] The expanded designation authority permits EOIR to temporarily assign qualified adjudicators to hear immigration cases across jurisdictions, allowing the agency to adjust staffing levels, reallocate adjudicatory resources, and respond to caseload imbalances in order to increase overall case-processing capacity.
[15] The withdrawn proposal amended the CBCA by implementing regulations (12 CFR § 303(E)) removing the exemption in § 303.82(b)(2), which currently eliminates the need for a separate FDIC notice when the Federal Reserve Board reviews a related change-in-control filing. Eliminating this exemption would have expanded FDIC review to certain indirect acquisitions and increased the number of required CBCA notices.
[16] The revision raised the coverage threshold from lenders originating 100 or more covered credit transactions per year to 500 or more, exempting many small lenders. The rule also eliminated several data elements required under Section 1071, including pricing variables, certain applicant demographic fields, and detailed underwriting information, substantially reducing the scope of required reporting.
[17] The CPR requires large banks to submit annual capital plans to the Fed demonstrating that they can maintain capital adequacy under baseline and stressed conditions while continuing planned capital distributions. The SCB is an additional capital requirement derived from the Fed’s supervisory stress test and reflects the projected decline in a firm’s common equity tier 1 capital ratio under stress; it is added to each firm’s regulatory capital minimums to ensure resilience in adverse scenarios.
[18] The eSLR is a non-risk-based capital requirement applied to U.S. global systemically important bank holding companies and their insured depository institutions. It requires these firms to maintain a minimum Tier 1 capital ratio relative to total leverage exposure, serving as a backstop to risk-based capital rules.