Milestones in the Evolution of the Administrative State
The modern administrative state, as measured by several metrics, has grown significantly over the last hundred years.
These documents are the apex of the Center's academic research. Our working papers are authored with the intention of publishing them in peer-reviewed journals at a later date, and our journal articles are setting the standard in their academic disciplines.
Milestones in the Evolution of the Administrative State
The modern administrative state, as measured by several metrics, has grown significantly over the last hundred years.
Beyond Republicans and the Disapproval of Regulations
This article finds that the Congressional Review Act has become an institutionalized instrument of oversight of regulatory policymaking.
The study of Congress largely focuses on its members, committees, and leaders. Meanwhile, the study of federal agencies tends to focus on those that fall within the executive branch. But many agencies and institutions exist to support Congress, and administrative law and political science scholarship has largely overlooked their internal operations.
Bespoke regulatory review, fit to the particulars of each independent regulatory agency, could help remedy regulatory analysis deficiencies at independent regulatory agencies, while also addressing the long-standing legal and political stalemate of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) review of independent regulatory agencies.
Milestones in the Evolution of the Administrative State
The modern administrative state, as measured by number of agencies, their budgets and staffing, and the number of regulations they issue, has grown significantly over the last hundred years. This essay reviews the origins of the administrative state, and identifies four milestone efforts to hold it accountable to the American people: passage of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946, the economic deregulation of the 1970s and ‘80s, requirements for ex-ante regulatory impact analysis, and White House review.
Regulation in the Biden Administration
The Biden-Harris Administration will enjoy many important successes in its early days. The Executive Orders and Guidance Documents it will issue on or shortly after inauguration day will come close to restoring the regulatory environment that existed when President Trump took office. But the progressive agenda will be on hold, at least as long as Republicans control the Senate.
The Effects of GDPR on the Digital Economy
We review the existing literature on privacy, particularly GDPR, from a policy perspective. The evidence outlines data regulation's effects on competition, innovation, marketing activities, and cross-border data flows. The discussion highlights the tradeoffs between increased regulation of data protection and its effects on the market.
Time to Give Bootleggers the Boot!
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has an important and well-defined mission with broad public support. Too often, however, the Agency has sought to strengthen its position by aligning itself with politically powerful rent-seeking interests. My wish for the Agency on its fiftieth birthday is that it stays focused on its own mission and remembers that old adage: “Dilution is not the solution to pollution.”
Improvements in SEC Economic Analysis
Several D.C. Circuit decisions that remanded regulations to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) between 2005 and 2011 provide a natural experiment that permits researchers to identify the correlation between judicial review, the quality of regulatory agencies’ economic analysis, and its use in regulatory decisions. SEC economic analysis improved substantially following the issuance of new staff guidance on economic analysis in 2012.
The Durability of Regulatory Oversight
This article reflects on OIRA's evolution over the almost 40 years since the Paperwork Reduction Act created it in 1980 to understand what has made it so durable. It finds that regardless of their philosophy, presidents need an entity like OIRA to address the principal‐agent problem they face in managing the disparate agencies within the executive branch.