An examination of 1,000+ instances of notice and comment policymaking by government in China at the central, provincial, and municipal levels.
Journal Articles & Working Papers
These documents are the apex of the Center's academic research. Our working papers are authored with the intention of publishing them in peer-reviewed journals at a later date, and our journal articles are setting the standard in their academic disciplines.
Reorganization of Economists at the FCC
Key decisions of the FCC’s reorganization of its economists and lessons for managing specialists in a large and complex organization
The Durability of Governance Reform
The notice and comment process, in which government organizations make public draft laws and regulations and solicit feedback on these proposals, is a prominent governance reform in contemporary China.
Responding to Mass, Computer-Generated, and Malattributed Comments
A number of technological and political forces have transformed the once staid and insider dominated notice-and-comment process into a forum for large scale, sometimes messy, participation in regulatory decision making.
The notice and comment process is a prominent governance reform in contemporary China.
Sentiment and Uncertainty about Regulation
Regulatory policy can create economic and social benefits, but poorly designed or excessive regulation may generate substantial adverse effects on the economy.
Milestones in the Evolution of the Administrative State
The modern administrative state, as measured by several metrics, has grown significantly over the last hundred years.
Beyond Republicans and the Disapproval of Regulations
This article finds that the Congressional Review Act has become an institutionalized instrument of oversight of regulatory policymaking.
The study of Congress largely focuses on its members, committees, and leaders. Meanwhile, the study of federal agencies tends to focus on those that fall within the executive branch. But many agencies and institutions exist to support Congress, and administrative law and political science scholarship has largely overlooked their internal operations.
Bespoke regulatory review, fit to the particulars of each independent regulatory agency, could help remedy regulatory analysis deficiencies at independent regulatory agencies, while also addressing the long-standing legal and political stalemate of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) review of independent regulatory agencies.