Interim Final Rules Over Time: A Brief Empirical Analysis
Interim final rules are an exception to the APA requirement that agencies use the notice-and-comment process before finalizing a rulemaking.
Publications
The GW Regulatory Studies Center scholars regularly conduct applied research to understand regulatory policy and practice from a public interest perspective. Our content often takes the form of public interest comments, formal testimony, working papers, policy insights, and short commentaries analyzing the most pressing issues in regulatory policy. View the rest of our material by the different types of publications listed on this page or our research areas.
What We Publish
Journal Articles & Working Papers
Long-form publications intended for academic audiences that take a deep dive into a particular aspect of regulatory policy.
Public Comments & Testimonies
Scholarly analysis of the potential effects of particular rulemakings from federal agencies, and advice to Congress on how to improve the rulemaking process.
Commentaries & Insights
Short-form publications intended for all audiences which provide easy to access analysis of regulatory policy.
Books & Reports
Formal publications, often completed with other leading organizations and individuals, providing a thorough understanding of regulations and the rulemaking process.
Newsletters
The weekly Regulation Digest contains everything you need to know about regulatory policy today, and our monthly Center Update gives you all of the latest from our team.
For accessible charts and supporting data that you can use in your own publications or presentations, visit the Reg Stats page.
Latest Publications
National Association of Manufacturers puts a price tag on regulatory compliance
A Retrospective Review of Regulatory Review Itself
An interesting new paper from the Mercatus Center, “The Legacy of the Council on Wage and Price Stability”,* takes an instructive look back at the origins of centralized review of federal regulations.
Disclosure as a Form of Market-based Regulation
A new working paper seeks to identify the underlying incentive problems that caused the global financial crisis and how they may be resolved.
Bank Disclosure and Incentives
Korok Ray proposes a microeconomic model of a bank that acts as a financial intermediary engaging in maturity transformation.
Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy
Positive theorists have argued that administrative procedures enhance political control of the bureaucracy, in part by predisposing agencies toward policy choices preferred by legislators' favored constituents. Although this “deck-stacking” argument has been both influential and controversial, few scholars have subjected it to empirical examination. This article assesses the operation of a prominent administrative procedure—the notice and comment process—in the context of Medicare physician payment reform, a fundamental restructuring of the way in which the Medicare program pays for physician services.
How to Improve Retrospective Review and Reduce Regulatory Burdens
In response to a request for information, we filed a comment offering three recommendations to further DOE's retrospective review efforts.
Tight Budgets Constrain Some Regulatory Agencies, but Not All
Each year we examine the President’s proposed Budget of the United States to identify the outlays and staffing devoted to developing and enforcing federal regulations. This “regulators’ budget” report covers agencies whose regulations primarily affect private-sector activities, and expressly excludes budget and staffing associated with regulations that govern taxation, entitlement, procurement, subsidy, and credit functions.