These documents are the apex of the Center's academic research. Our working papers are authored with the intention of publishing them in peer-reviewed journals at a later date, and our journal articles are setting the standard in their academic disciplines.
Regulatory Impact Analysis and Litigation Risk
This paper explores the role that the regulatory impact analyses (RIAs) that agencies are required to prepare for important proposed rules play in decisions by courts about whether these rules should be upheld when they are challenged after promulgation.
Regulatory Oversight and Benefit-Cost Analysis: A Historical Perspective
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Executive Office of the President coordinates the federal government’s regulatory agenda, reviews executive branch agencies’ draft regulations, and oversees government-wide information quality, peer review, privacy, and statistical policies.
Behavioral public administration (BPA) research aspires not only to draw on developments in behavioral science but also, importantly, to address central themes in public administration. By focusing a symposium on bureaucratic red tape, administrative burden, and regulation, we encouraged BPA scholarship to engage with fundamental public administration topics that are also relevant for the broader literature on organizations and management.
Coproduction of Regulations Under the Administrative Procedure Act
Aligica et al. (2019) posit that a form of public administration founded in the classical liberal tradition should recognize value heterogeneity, which would create a need for coproduction of rules and polycentricity in the production of rules. Utilizing a dataset of 130 economically significant executive branch regulations proposed between 2008 and 2013, this paper assesses whether US regulators act in a manner consistent with the predictions of their theory.
This article examines the sponsorship and content of mass comment campaigns in administrative rulemaking in the United States. Mass comment campaigns consist of identical and near‐duplicate comments sponsored by organizations and submitted by group members and supporters to government agencies in response to proposed rules. Drawing from research on interest group lobbying, it is posited that organizations of all types sponsor mass comment campaigns, but that campaigns submitted by regulated entities (i.e., industries) are more substantive than campaigns generated by beneficiaries of stringent regulations (e.g., environmental advocacy groups).
