Academic books and long-term research projects published by Center scholars that advance the overall knowledge of various aspects of regulatory processes and policies.
A compilation of the works of the late Jerry Ellig, highlighting a legacy rooted in rational regulation driven by benefit-cost analysis societal benefit.
This comprehensive and interdisciplinary international Handbook examines the fundamental concepts, theories, practices, and empirical achievements and challenges in the contemporary study of regulatory authorities.
A review of available literature on potential economic impacts of reducing regulatory compliance burdens on business.
By: Bridget C.E. Dooling and Laura Stanley
By: Bridget C.E. Dooling, Daniel R. Pérez and Steven J. Balla
Scholars at the GW Regulatory Studies Center have frequently served as consultants to ACUS, producing the following reports.
The GW Regulatory Studies Center's cooperative agreement with the US Department of Agriculture to analyze agricultural regulations.
By: the GW Regulatory Studies Center and the Weidenbaum Center at Washington University in St. Louis.
Essay by: Christopher Carrigan
By: Susan E. Dudley and Jerry Brito
Edited by: Cary Coglianese, Adam M. Finkel, and Christopher Carrigan
By: Steven J. Balla & William T. Gormley, Jr.
Since 2018, Regulatory Studies Center scholars have co-authored the Rulemaking chapter of "Developments in Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice," an annual publication of the American Bar Association.
By D. Pérez, S. Dudley, N. Eisner, R. Lutter, D. Zorn, N. Nord, and K. Wegrich
Chapter by Sofie E. Miller and Brian Mannix
What are People Saying About COVID-19-Related Regulations?
Government agencies have taken various regulatory actions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. What are people saying about these regulatory responses? Which ones have prompted the most discussion? And, most importantly, which regulations should be most urgently addressed?
Accounting for Regulatory Reform Under Executive Order 13771
Executive Order (EO) 13771, known as the “regulatory two-for-one” EO, imposed new constraints on executive branch regulatory agencies, directing them to: (1) to cut two existing rules for each new rule issued and (2) offset any costs imposed by new rules while operating under a regulatory cost cap.
This report examines the relationship between the organization of economists in agencies and the robustness and integrity of economic analysis that is intended to inform decisions about the design and adoption of individual regulations.
