EPA's Benefit-Cost Analysis in the Rulemaking Process
The EPA is “soliciting comment on whether and how EPA should promulgate regulations that provide a consistent and transparent interpretation relating to the consideration of weighing costs
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Featured: The Congressional Review Act
What it does
The Congressional Review Act (CRA) establishes procedures for Congress to overturn final rules issued by federal agencies. After an agency's rule is reported to Congress, members of Congress have 60 days to introduce a joint resolution disapproving of the rule. When signed into law, these resolutions of disapproval (RDs) overturn the rule in question and bar agencies from issuing a "substantially similar" rule. The CRA offers two unique mechanisms: the Senate "fast-track" procedures and the "lookback" period. For an in-depth discussion of these mechanics and more, see our Regulatory Insight A Lookback at the Law: How Congress Uses the CRA.
CRA Use Trending Upward for Both Major and Non-major Rules, 1996-2022
CRA Window Exploratory Dashboard
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This dashboard allows users to explore the set of final rules published in the Federal Register in 2024, and how various lookback dates could affect the set of rules available for congressional review at the beginning of the next session of Congress. View Dashboard.
Commentary:
The Continued Evolution of the Congressional Review Act. Susan Dudley & Steve Balla, April 22, 2026. Previously considered largely a tool for the incoming Congress and president to overturn a departing president's midnight regulations, Congress has recently begun using the CRA in unanticipated ways.
Our Latest Publications
Cumulative Economically Significant Final Rules by Administration
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EPA's ANPRM on Increasing Transparency in Benefit-Cost Analysis
In this Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the Environmental Protection Agency sets a worthwhile goal of improving the consistency and transparency of the agency’s use of economic analyses to inform its rulemaking decisions.
Benefit-Cost Analysis as a Check on Administrative Discretion
Benefit-cost analysis (BCA) continues to be the principal tool used by American presidents to guide the discretionary decisions of regulatory agencies under their supervision, and increasingly it is viewed by the courts as an important consideration for agencies to take into account in justifying their regulatory decisions. This paper argues that BCA is properly viewed, not simply as a technocratic planning tool, but as a solution to a principal-agent problem.