Regulators' Budget Increases Consistent with Growth in Fiscal Budget
This year’s “regulators’ budget” presents the President’s requested budget outlays and staffing in fiscal year (FY) 2016.
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Featured: The Congressional Review Act
What it does
The Congressional Review Act (CRA) establishes procedures for Congress to overturn final rules issued by federal agencies. After an agency's rule is reported to Congress, members of Congress have 60 days to introduce a joint resolution disapproving of the rule. When signed into law, these resolutions of disapproval (RDs) overturn the rule in question and bar agencies from issuing a "substantially similar" rule. The CRA offers two unique mechanisms: the Senate "fast-track" procedures and the "lookback" period. For an in-depth discussion of these mechanics and more, see our Regulatory Insight A Lookback at the Law: How Congress Uses the CRA.
CRA Use Trending Upward for Both Major and Non-major Rules, 1996-2022
CRA Window Exploratory Dashboard
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This dashboard allows users to explore the set of final rules published in the Federal Register in 2024, and how various lookback dates could affect the set of rules available for congressional review at the beginning of the next session of Congress. View Dashboard.
Commentary:
The Continued Evolution of the Congressional Review Act. Susan Dudley & Steve Balla, April 22, 2026. Previously considered largely a tool for the incoming Congress and president to overturn a departing president's midnight regulations, Congress has recently begun using the CRA in unanticipated ways.
Our Latest Publications
Cumulative Economically Significant Final Rules by Administration
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The Limits of Irrationality as a Rationale for Regulation
James Madison was speaking of the structural checks on governmental power when he wrote those words, but it is worth recalling his advice when we contemplate the role of benefit-cost analysis as a check on the unconstrained exercise of the government's regulatory powers, and the implications of the reality that people's behavior, both in and out of government, sometimes falls short of what we might incorporate into an economic model or hope for in a perfect world.
Point/Counterpoint: Valuing Internalities in Regulatory Impact Analysis
In this Point/Counterpoint series of 4 articles in the new issue of the Journal of Policy Analysis & Management, Brian Mannix & Susan Dudley engage in a back-and-forth with Hunt Allcott & Cass Sunstein on the advisability of regulatory interventions based solely on "internalities," which Allcott & Sunstein define as "costs we impose on ourselves by taking actions that are not in our own best interest."