Homepage featured content

Featured: The Congressional Review Act

What it does

The Congressional Review Act (CRA) establishes procedures for Congress to overturn final rules issued by federal agencies. After an agency's rule is reported to Congress, members of Congress have 60 days to introduce a joint resolution disapproving of the rule. When signed into law, these resolutions of disapproval (RDs) overturn the rule in question and bar agencies from issuing a "substantially similar" rule. The CRA offers two unique mechanisms: the Senate "fast-track" procedures and the "lookback" period. For an in-depth discussion of these mechanics and more, see our Regulatory Insight A Lookback at the Law: How Congress Uses the CRA. 

CRA Use Trending Upward for Both Major and Non-major Rules, 1996-2022

Line chart showing trends in the number of Congressional Review Act resolutions introduced by calendar year. The chart peaks in 2017, with 67 resolutions introduced in Congress at the beginning of the Trump administration.

CRA Window Exploratory Dashboard

Image
CRA Window Exploratory Dashboard - screen grab


This dashboard allows users to explore the set of final rules published in the Federal Register in 2024, and how various lookback dates could affect the set of rules available for congressional review at the beginning of the next session of Congress. View Dashboard.

Commentary:

The Continued Evolution of the Congressional Review Act. Susan Dudley & Steve Balla, April 22, 2026. Previously considered largely a tool for the incoming Congress and president to overturn a departing president's midnight regulations, Congress has recently begun using the CRA in unanticipated ways.

Explore Our Coverage


Our Latest Publications

 

Cumulative Economically Significant Final Rules by Administration

Image
Cumulative Econ Significant Rules Over Entire 02/2026

View All Charts

 

Review of In the Web of Politics: Three Decades of the U.S. Federal Executive

Aberbach and Rockman draw on more than two decades of research to support their argument that the quality, morale, and responsiveness of presidential appointees and senior civil servants have not declined in the manner suggested by some critics of the bureaucracy.

(Mis)Applications of Behavioral Economics to Regulation

In this paper, Smith evaluates the recent promotion of libertarian paternalism as a viable means of coordinating market activities. In doing so, Smith challenges the notion that “anti-antipaternalism” logically follows from the findings in behavioral economics.

View All Publications >>